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PLAINLY OFFENSIVE BABEL: AN ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING PLAINLY
OFFENSIVE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Jerry C. Chiang
Abstract: The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to
free speech. The guarantee is not absolute, however, and the U.S. Supreme Court has said
that the First Amendment does not fully protect student speech in public schools. In Bethel
School District v. Fraser, the Court held that schools could regulate "plainly offensive"
speech. Circuit courts have interpreted and applied Fraser in an inconsistent manner,
disagreeing as to what constitutes plainly offensive speech. The resulting case law is
confusing and fails to provide lower courts with a clear analytical framework for evaluating
First Amendment challenges to regulations of student speech. This Comment clarifies the
methodology applied in Fraser by demonstrating that the Court considered several distinct
factors lower courts should analyze when determining whether student speech is plainly
offensive. This Comment further proposes an analytical framework that follows the Court's
approach in Fraser; lower courts evaluating the propriety of student speech should focus on
the content, context, and consequence of the speech.
Although students in public schools do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech ... at the schoolhouse gate,"' those rights
receive less protection in the school context.2 In three separate cases, the
U.S. Supreme Court has approved limitations imposed by a school on
student speech. First, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District,3 the Court held that schools can regulate student speech that
substantially disrupts school discipline.4 In Bethel School District v.
Fraser,5 the Court went further, authorizing schools to regulate "plainly
offensive" speech.6 Finally, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,7
the Court established that schools may regulate school-sponsored
speech-regardless of whether the particular school-sponsored speech in
question could be deemed disruptive under Tinker or plainly offensive
under Fraser-provided that such regulation furthers legitimate
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
2. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
3. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4. See id. at 509.
5. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
6. Id. at 683.
7. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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pedagogical concerns.
Despite the guidance provided by these student speech cases-
referred to by commentators as "the Tinker trilogy" 9-the exact borders
of First Amendment protection of student speech in public schools
remain unclear. 10 Although hundreds of lower court cases have
attempted to grapple with various restrictions imposed by schools on
student speech," the Supreme Court has not revisited the topic.' 2 Lower
courts are thus forced to rely on their own interpretations and analyses of
the Tinker trilogy without further guidance from the Supreme Court.
In particular, while the Fraser opinion discusses several factors
relevant to determining whether speech is plainly offensive, it does not
explicitly provide a coherent analytical framework.' 3 Lacking clear
guidance, lower courts have not consistently interpreted and applied
Fraser to determine if student speech is plainly offensive. 14 This
inconsistency is twofold. Some circuits have claimed to follow Fraser
without applying all of the factors that the Court analyzed in its
opinion. 15 Other circuits have applied most or all of the factors discussed
in Fraser without identifying a framework for lower courts and other
8. Id. at 273.
9. See, e.g., Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54
BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 646 (2002).
10. See Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 2006) ("This case requires
us to sail into the unsettled waters of free speech rights in public schools, waters rife with rocky
shoals and uncertain currents.").
11. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse
Gates: What's Left ofTinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 528 (2000).
12. As of this Comment's publication, the Supreme Court has heard oral arguments on
Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 722 (Dec. 1, 2006)
(argued March, 19, 2007), a student free speech case where the district and appellate courts
disagreed about whether the speech in question was plainly offensive. For further discussion of
Frederick, see infra Part III.B.
13. See Guiles, 461 F.3d at 330 ("[T]he exact contours of what is plainly offensive are not so
clear to us as the star Arcturus is on a cloudless night .. "); see also Miller, supra note 9, at 640-
41. Miller explains that the Tinker trilogy has left the lower courts in a state of confusion. Courts
have stretched "[tihe Fraser and [Hazelwood] 'categories' of speech" to cause "almost any speech
to be regulated under the more lenient standards." Id. at 646. Thus, precise definitions of the
categories of speech are necessary "in order for the Tinker trilogy to create a workable and
understandable framework for dealing with student expression in schools. Without guidance, the
rules espoused by Tinker, Fraser, and [Hazelwood) have become nebulous and unpredictable." /d.
14. See David L. Hudson, Jr. & John E. Ferguson, Jr., The Courts' Inconsistent Treatment of
Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 181, 191 (2002)
(discussing the circuit split that has resulted from inconsistent lower court interpretations of Fraser).
15. See infra Part III.A.
404
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circuit courts to follow.
16
This Comment clarifies the methodology applied in Fraser and, based
on that methodology, argues that several circuit courts have misapplied
the decision. In Fraser, the Court implicitly focused on the content,
context, and consequence of speech in determining whether it was
plainly offensive. This Comment argues that to remain faithful to
Fraser, lower courts should apply a framework that would only find
student speech plainly offensive when the speech satisfies the content,
context, and consequence factors of Fraser.
Part I of this Comment briefly explains free speech rights under the
First Amendment and the narrow circumstances where the government
can regulate free speech. Part II of this Comment discusses the
limitations that may be imposed on student free speech under Tinker,
Fraser, and Hazelwood. It also addresses the three factors applied by the
Supreme Court in Fraser, outlining why each factor is essential to
prevent unconstitutional proscription of student speech. Part III analyzes
decisions from four circuit courts of appeals to illustrate their
inconsistent application of the Fraser opinion. Finally, Part IV argues
that the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have engaged in an overly broad
reading of Fraser and that the Ninth and Second Circuits, while
appearing to properly apply most or all the factors of Fraser, have not
done so with sufficient clarity to allow lower courts to reach consistent
outcomes. This is potentially problematic because circuit courts often
look to one another for guidance, and until one court sets forth a clear
framework, the law in this area will remain confused.
I. THE GOVERNMENT CAN REGULATE SPEECH IN LIMITED
AREAS, BUT SUCH REGULATIONS CANNOT BE OVERLY
BROAD
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right of
free speech. 17 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the First
Amendment prevents government from "proscribing" speech or
expressive conduct solely because the government "disapprov[es] of the
ideas expressed."' 8  Accordingly, content-based regulations are
16. See infra Parts I1I.B & III.C.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.").
18. See R.A.V. v. City of St, Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
405
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presumptively invalid. 19 However, the Court has permitted content-based
restrictions of free speech in a few limited cases,2 ° such as "fighting
words, 21 or substantially-disruptive student speech in public schools.
22
The Court has recognized that, even in those limited circumstances
where the government can regulate speech, such regulation cannot be
overly broad.23 There are two purposes to this overbreadth doctrine.
First, it ensures that regulations do not outlaw constitutionally protected
speech.24 Second, it helps prevent the "chilling effect" overly broad laws
may have on third parties. 25 An overly broad law could "chill" a person
from engaging in a constitutionally guaranteed activity, such as
criticizing government officials, because she may fear that the law
would regulate her seemingly constitutional conduct.
26
This same analysis is appropriate for overly broad exceptions to a
rule. The Court has recognized that exceptions to First Amendment
rights should be narrowly construed.27 Narrow interpretations of
exceptions to constitutionally granted rights prevent a broadly construed
offensive or disagreeable.").
19. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382.
20. See id. at 382-83.
21. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("[I]t is well understood that
the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." (citations omitted)).
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See generally City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,458-59 (1987); see also KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW, 321 (1999) ("Overbreadth... results in
the invalidation of a law 'on its face' rather than 'as applied' to a particular speaker. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her .... If a law
restricting speech is invalidated as applied to a protected speaker, it is held inapplicable to that
speaker.").
24. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 459 (explaining that criminal statutes "that make unlawful a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also have
legitimate application."); see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972) ("[T]he statute
must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not
be susceptible of application to protected expression.").
25. See Gooding, 405 U.S. at 521.
26. See id. (justifying broad standing doctrine in First Amendment cases because "persons
whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear
of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression").
27. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 428 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[W]e
have consistently construed the 'fighting words' exception set forth in Chaplinsky narrowly."
(internal citations omitted)).
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exception from swallowing the rule.28
II. SCHOOLS MAY RESTRICT SUBSTANTIALLY DISRUPTIVE,
PLAINLY OFFENSIVE, OR SCHOOL-SPONSORED SPEECH
Students do not lose their First Amendment right to freedom of
speech or expression when they arrive at school. Student speech rights,
however, are limited due to the "special characteristics of the school
environment., 29 The Supreme Court has held that a student's right to
free speech is subject to restriction by school officials when the speech
falls into any of three categories: substantially disruptive,30  plainly
offensive,3 1 or school-sponsored.32
A. Schools May Regulate Student Speech that Substantially Disrupts
School Discipline or Invades the Rights of Other Students
Under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,33 schools may regulate student speech otherwise protected by
the First Amendment if the regulation at issue targets speech which
substantially disrupts school discipline or invades the rights of other
students.34 Tinker involved a challenge to a ban on wearing black
armbands in schools. 35 Principals of the Des Moines schools instituted
the ban after learning that a group of parents and students planned to
28. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 n.7 (1984). ("We emphasize, as we have in
the past, that the political-function exception must be narrowly construed; otherwise the exception
will swallow the rule.") Bernal involved a resident alien who challenged a statute requiring that a
notary public be a U.S. citizen as overly broad and violative of equal protection. See id. at 213-14.
29. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see also infra Part
lI.B.
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. See infra Part 11.B.
32. See infra Part II.C.
33. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker is often characterized as the Court's seminal student free
speech decision. See Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 527 ("Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District is the most important Supreme Court case in history protecting the
constitutional rights of students."); see also Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 14, at 185 (referring to
Tinker as the "leading First Amendment free-speech case for public school students").
34. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 ("But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of free speech.").
35. See id. at 504.
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wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.3 6 Despite the ban,
several students, including siblings John and Mary Beth Tinker, wore
black armbands to school.37 School officials suspended students who
defied the ban until they agreed to return without their armbands.38 The
parents of the suspended students sued the school district.
In ruling that the school district's prohibition of black armbands was
unconstitutional, the Court articulated a protective standard for
regulating student speech.40 The Court first established that the First
Amendment protects student speech in the school environment. 41 School
officials may not regulate a student's speech merely to avoid
controversy.42 Instead, school officials bear the burden of demonstrating
that the challenged speech substantially disrupts school discipline43 or
invades the rights of other students. 4 Applying this standard, the Court
held that the armband ban unconstitutionally restricted the students'
speech because school officials failed to provide sufficient evidence that
the restriction was necessary to prevent a substantial disruption.45
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 530 ("The majority's [opinion) might be termed the
'speech protective model."').
41. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 ("It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
42. See id. at 509 ("In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition
of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.").
43. See id. ("Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden
conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot be sustained." (citations omitted)).
44. See id. at 508 (defining "invades the rights of other students" as the "collision with the
rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone"); see also, e.g., Harper ex rel. Harper v.
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot Harper ex rel.
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 127 S.Ct. 1484 (2007). The Court in Harper defined the
"invasion" prong of Tinker to mean physical safety and peace of mind. See id. at 1177-78.
Specifically, the Court stated that students should be secure from "physical assaults" and
"psychological attacks that cause young people to question their self-worth and their rightful place
in society." See id. at 1178. The invasion prong also encompasses the right to be let alone, a
"recognizable privacy interest in avoiding unwanted communication." See id.
45. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 ("[T]he record does not demonstrate any facts which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption or material interference with
school activities, and no disturbances or disorders occurred. These petitioners merely went about
their ordained rounds in school."); see also id. at 511 ("Clearly, the prohibition of expression of one
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B. Schools May Regulate Plainly Offensive Student Speech Under the
Framework Implicitly Provided in Fraser
In Bethel School District v. Fraser,46 the Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment does not prohibit schools from regulating student
speech that is "plainly offensive. 4 7 Matthew Fraser, a student at Bethel
High School, delivered a speech nominating a classmate for student
office at an assembly of approximately 600 students. 48 Throughout his
speech, Fraser explained the qualities of the candidate "in terms of an
elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor. 4 9 During Fraser's
speech some students yelled and others used gestures to simulate the
sexual activities to which he alluded.5 ° Some students were "bewildered
and embarrassed. 5 1 The school suspended Fraser for three days.52 In
response, his parents sued the school district.53
As a general proposition, the Court held that school officials may
constitutionally regulate "plainly offensive" 54 student speech such as that
engaged in by Fraser.55 In coming to its conclusion, the Court did not
explicitly announce an analytical framework for identifying plainly
offensive student speech. Nevertheless, a close reading of Fraser reveals
that the Court evaluated three factors in determining whether the student
particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.").
46. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
47. See id. at 683.
48. Id. at 677.
49. Id. at 678. In his speech, Fraser said, "I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants,
he's firm in his shirt, his character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of
Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take
an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and
pushing until finally-he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end--even the climax, for
each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president-he'll never come between
you and the best our high school can be." See id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 678.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 679.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 683.
55. See id. at 685; see also id. at 681 (explaining that the need for a "plainly offensive"
exception to student free speech is based on the school's duty to balance the "freedom to advocate
unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms" against "society's countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior").
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speech at issue was plainly offensive: 56  content, context, and
consequence.
57
1. Content: Fraser Defines Plainly Offensive Speech as Lewd,
Indecent, or Vulgar
Schools may not constitutionally regulate student speech simply
because it contains a controversial message.58 This was the holding of
Tinker, and Fraser in no way undermines that conclusion.59 In fact,
nowhere in Fraser does the Court imply that regulating a speech such as
Matthew Fraser's on the basis that it conveyed a controversial message
would be constitutionally permissible.
The problem, then, was not with the political message expressed in
Fraser's speech, but with the manner in which that message was
conveyed-specifically, the Court focused on the lewd, indecent, and
vulgar content of Fraser's speech. 60 The Court found Fraser's speech
plainly offensive because of its sexually explicit metaphors.6'
Additionally, the Court held that "offensively lewd and indecent"
speech, such as the nomination speech, could be regulated by the
schools.62 In order for student speech to be constitutionally regulated as
plainly offensive under Fraser, the threshold question is one of content:
is the student speech lewd, indecent, or vulgar?
56. Chief Justice Burger coined the term "plainly offensive." He explained, "[t]he pervasive
sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was plainly offensive to both teachers and students." Fraser,
478 U.S. at 683.
57. The Court analyzed these three factors, and the facts of the case satisfied all three factors.
See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text. However, the Court did not categorize those factors
as content, context, and consequence, and did not explicitly require that all future instances of
offensive speech must satisfy the three factors to constitute plainly offensive speech. See infra notes
58-76 and accompanying text. The lack of an explicit requirement to follow the Court's factors
contributes to the confusion in the circuits. See Miller, supra note 9, at 640.
58. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
59. See id. at 680. The Court preserved the holding of Tinker by distinguishing the speech
involved in Tinker from that in Fraser. The court noted that "[tihe marked distinction between the
political 'message' of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this
case seems to have been given little weight by the Court of Appeals." Id. The Court more directly
distinguished Fraser from Tinker by stating, "[u]nlike the sanctions imposed on the students
wearing armbands in Tinker, penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any political
viewpoint." Id. at 685.
60. See id. at 683.
61. See id.
62. See id.
Vol. 82:403, 2007
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2. Context: Under Fraser, Speech Must Occur in a Curricular Context
To Be Plainly Offensive
The second factor the Court examined was the curricular context 63 in
which the speech took place.64 The Court emphasized that Fraser's
sexually-charged speech occurred during a mandatory school
assembly.65 The Court noted, "[a] high school assembly or classroom is
no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an
unsuspecting audience of teenage students. 66 Thus, the context of
Fraser's speech-a mandatory school assembly-was a crucial factor in
the Court's analysis.
Importantly, Justice Brennan's concurrence explained that student
speech does not necessarily occur in a curricular context merely because
it takes place on school grounds.67 For example, Fraser might have been
decided differently had Fraser given his speech in the locker room.68
Although the Court did not explicitly adopt Justice Brennan's reasoning,
the Court's language is revealing: instead of using a blanket statement
such as "school is no place for a sexually explicit monologue," the Court
limited its discussion of plainly offensive conduct to that which occurs
in the "school assembly" and "classroom., 69 The classroom and school
assembly room are spaces where students are normally educated; by
definition then, speech which occurs in these spaces normally happens in
63. By curricular context, the author means a space where a school educates students, such as
the classroom, assembly room, auditorium, or gymnasium. The author credits the term curricular
context to Justice Brennan's dissent in Hazelwood, where he wrote that "[m]anifestly, student
speech is more likely to disrupt a curricular function when it arises in the context of a curricular
activity-one that is 'designed to teach' something-than when it arises in the context of a
noncurricular activity." See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 283 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan fleshed out the idea of a curricular context with the
following example: "the school may constitutionally punish the budding political orator if he
disrupts calculus class but not if he holds his tongue for the cafeteria." Id.
64. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (noting that "[t]he determination of what manner of speech in
the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board"
(emphasis added)).
65. See id. at 677.
66. See id. at 685.
67. See id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Respondent's speech may well have been
protected had he given it in school but under different circumstances, where the school's legitimate
interests in teaching and maintaining civil public discourse were less weighty."). Brennan's
concurrence appears to suggest that a student's expression on campus does not automatically or
necessarily implicate curricular concerns.
68. See id. at 696 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 683.
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the curricular context. 70 Thus, while the Court did not explicitly identify
classroom speech as taking place in a curricular context, the fact that it
focused its discussion only on the classroom and the assembly indicates
that a finding of a curricular context is necessary for the "plainly
offensive" analysis. This reading is strengthened by Justice Brennan's
concurrence, which stated that Fraser's speech might have been
protected had it been delivered in a non-curricular setting.71
3. Consequence: Under Fraser, Speech Must Disrupt a Curricular
Activity or Educational Mission of the School To Be Plainly
Offensive
The last factor the Court focused on in determining that speech such
as Fraser's may be constitutionally regulated was the disruptive
consequence of Fraser's speech on the curricular activity or educational
mission.12 The Court emphasized that not only did Fraser's speech take
place in a curricular context, but that it also had a disruptive effect on the
assembly, as evidenced by students yelling, gesturing, or appearing
"bewildered" and "embarrassed., 73 The Court explained that the
consequence of the speech is relevant because the First Amendment does
not prevent school officials from regulating speech that would
"undermine the school's basic educational mission., 74 As a result, a
school may constitutionally proscribe speech or conduct that: is lewd,
indecent, or vulgar; takes place in a curricular context; has a disrupting
consequence in that context; and as such is "wholly inconsistent with the
'fundamental values' of public school education."
75
70. See supra note 63.
71. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
72. See id. at 683 ("[T]he schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential
lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or
offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy."); see also id. at 689
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court's holding concerns only the authority that school officials
have to restrict a high school student's use of disruptive language in a speech given to a high school
assembly.").
73. See id. at 678.
74. Id. at 685; see also id. at 683-84.
75. Id. at 685-86. In dicta, the Court also indicated that schools could prospectively regulate
speech likely to disrupt the curricular activities. See id. at 683 ("Surely it is a highly appropriate
function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public
discourse. Indeed, the 'fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic system'
disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others. Nothing in the
Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate
Vol. 82:403, 2007
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C. Schools May Regulate School-Sponsored Student Speech If
Reasonably Related to Legitimate Pedagogical Concerns
Finally, school officials may also constitutionally regulate "school-
sponsored" student speech if the regulation furthers legitimate
pedagogical concerns.76 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier7
addressed student speech in a high school sponsored newspaper.
Journalism students at Hazelwood East High School were permitted to
publish articles in the school's newspaper only after the principal
approved page proofs.78 The journalism students sued when the principal
refused to allow publication of two stories, one discussing teen
pregnancy and the other discussing the impact of divorce on students at
the high school.79
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the school district, holding that
school officials have the authority to regulate school-sponsored student
speech "so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns."80  The Court declined to apply Tinker,
distinguishing it as a case concerning a school's ability to silence student
speech. 8' In contrast, the Court characterized Hazelwood as reviewing a
school's authority to exercise editorial control over school-sponsored
student speech. 82 The Court reasoned that a school is "entitled to
exercise greater control" over student speech "to assure that participants
learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their
level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school. 8 3 Accordingly, schools do not
violate the First Amendment by "exercising editorial control over the
style and content of student speech" in a context such as a school-
and subject to sanctions.").
76. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
77. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
78. See id. at 263.
79. See id. at 263-64.
80. See id. at 273.
81. See id. at 271-72.
82. See id. at 271 ("The latter question concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school....
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form of student expression ... .
83. See id.
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sponsored newspaper.84
In establishing the school's authority to regulate school-sponsored
student speech, the Court also recognized the outer limit of such
authority. The Court held that editorial control over school-sponsored
student speech is constitutionally permissible so long as it relates to
"legitimate pedagogical concerns." 85 Although the Court did not define
"legitimate pedagogical concerns," it noted that when a school's
regulation "has no valid educational purpose," the First Amendment
protects students' free speech rights.86
D. Fraser Should Be Read as an Exception to Tinker's Speech-
Protective Model
In the course of its analysis in Hazelwood, the Court distinguished
Tinker from Fraser based on the degree of disruption required by each
test. The Court first acknowledged that different First Amendment
analyses were applied in Tinker and Fraser.87 In Tinker, the Court
required "substantial" disruption.88 In Fraser, the Court discussed the
disruption that occurred at the assembly and recognized school officials'
ability to prevent speech that would undermine their educational
mission.89 In so doing, however, the Court in Fraser did not use the
adjective "substantial" or any comparable term to denote the degree of
disruption required. 90 Thus, the disruption in Tinker is a greater
threshold for school officials to meet than the disruption in Fraser.
91
Tinker therefore appears to impose a higher burden of proof on school
officials than Fraser.
Fraser should thus be read as an exception to the speech-protective
84. Id. at 273.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 271 nA.
88. See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
89. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678, 685 (1986).
90. See id. at 685.
91. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 n.4. Lower courts have similarly distinguished Tinker from
Fraser. In Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, the Second Circuit noted that Fraser "declined to
apply Tinker's more exacting material and substantial disturbance test." 461 F.3d 320, 325 (2d Cir.
2006). Additionally, in Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State College Area School District, the Third Circuit
noted that Fraser defined a narrow category of speech "that a school may restrict even without the
threat of substantial disruption." 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001).
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model of Tinker.92 The Court itself distinguished Fraser from Tinker,93
explaining that the legal analysis in Fraser was based on the "plainly
offensive" model, rather than Tinker's substantial-disruption model.94
Thus, while the Court has not explicitly termed Fraser as an "exception"
to Tinker, the differences in the legal analysis and threshold for
disruption are sufficient to constitute a departure from Tinker.
In sum, Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood have carved out three specific
and narrow areas where schools may constitutionally regulate student
speech that is otherwise protected by the First Amendment. The general
rule is that student speech may be proscribed only if it substantially
disrupts school discipline or invades the rights of others. Even if student
speech is not substantially disruptive, it may be regulated if it is either:
(1) plainly offensive or (2) school sponsored and the regulation furthers
legitimate pedagogical concerns. 95
III. LOWER COURTS INCONSISTENTLY INTERPRET AND
APPLY FRASER
Lacking clear guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, the circuit
courts have inconsistently applied Fraser.96 Two circuits have concluded
that certain student speech is plainly offensive and as such may be
92. See Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 536; supra part II.A. Professor Chemerinsky has noted
that the Supreme Court has yet to follow the Tinker model in its subsequent student free speech
cases. See id. ("Tinker has never been expressly overruled or even openly questioned in later
Supreme Court opinions. But its approach has also never been followed in cases involving
elementary, middle school, and high school students.").
93. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 n.4.
94. See id.
95. For convenience, courts look first to whether speech is plainly offensive or school
sponsored before applying the more general Tinker rule. See, e.g., Guiles, 461 F.3d at 325; Saxe,
240 F.3d at 214 ("To summarize: Under Fraser, a school may categorically prohibit lewd, vulgar, or
profane language. Under Hazelwood, a school may regulate school-sponsored speech .... Speech
falling outside of these categories is subject to Tinker's general rule .... "); Chandler v.
McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992). This analysis in this Part is organized to
show that Tinker is the rule and Fraser and Hazelwood are the exceptions.
96. See Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 14, at 191 (discussing a split among the circuits
between those who hold that Fraser "allows schools to censor any speech deemed vulgar or
offensive" and those who hold that Fraser "only allows the regulation of speech that is sponsored
by the school"); see also Jonathan Pyle, Speech in Public Schools: Different Context or Different
Rights? 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 586, 597 (2002) ("The opinion in Fraser is the crux of confusion in
the field."). The inconsistency can be seen in many circuits. See Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 529
(noting that "lower federal courts have not followed a consistent pattern over the last thirty years").
This Comment examines and attempts to resolve the issue by reviewing cases from the Second,
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.
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constitutionally regulated without applying all three factors analyzed in
Fraser.97 One circuit court has examined all three Fraser factors in
determining whether student speech could be constitutionally regulated
as plainly offensive, but has done so in a haphazard manner lacking a
clear analytical framework. 98 Finally, another circuit court has examined
at least two out of three Fraser factors, but also does not provide a clear
analytical framework, making it unclear whether this circuit has adopted
all three of Fraser's prongs.99
A. Two Circuit Courts Have Neither Examined Nor Required All
Three Fraser Factors in Determining Whether Student Speech Is
Plainly Offensive
Of the circuit courts of appeal that have squarely addressed questions
about regulation of plainly offensive student speech, two do not analyze
all three Fraser factors. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits focus primarily
on the content of student speech in determining whether it is plainly
offensive. These circuits do not always examine the context or
consequence factors of Fraser.
For example, in Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education,100 the
Sixth Circuit focused only on the content prong of Fraser in concluding
that a school could properly prohibit a student from wearing a t-shirt that
a school official considered both offensive' °' and contrary to the
school's educational mission. 10 2 In ruling for the school, the court
97. See infra Part IlIl.A; Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000);
Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, 324 F.3d 1246 (1 th Cir. 2003).
98. See infra Part 1II.B; Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006), cert granted, 127 S.
Ct. 722 (Dec. 1,2006).
99. See infra Part IlI.C; Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006).
100. 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).
101. See Boroff, 220 F.3d at 467. The front of the t-shirt had a "three-faced Jesus" with the
words "See No Truth. Hear No Truth. Speak No Truth." Id. On the back of the t-shirt, the word
"BELIEVE" was spelled out with the letters "LIE" highlighted. Id. Marilyn Manson's name,
although not his picture, was displayed on the front of the shirt. Id. School officials objected to the t-
shirt and ordered the student to turn the shirt inside-out, go home and change, or leave school and be
considered truant. Id. The student left school, but returned to school wearing a different Marilyn
Manson t-shirt on each of the next four school days. Id. Each day, the student was told that he could
not attend school while wearing Marilyn Manson t-shirts. Id.
102. See id. at 469 ("The School in this case, according to the affidavit of Principal Clifton,
found the Marilyn Manson T-shirts to be offensive because the band promotes destructive conduct
and demoralizing values that are contrary to the educational mission of the school."); see also id. at
470 (noting that the principal deemed Marilyn Manson's lyrics to be "contrary to the school['s]
mission and goal of establishing 'a common core of values that include.., human dignity and
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interpreted Fraser to give school officials the authority both to
determine whether student speech is appropriate or inappropriate and to
regulate inappropriate speech. 0 3 The court ruled that because the
student's t-shirt was offensive and contrary to the school's educational
mission, 10 4 the school could constitutionally prohibit the wearing of the
t-shirt on school grounds.105 In reaching its conclusion, however, the
court did not discuss the context in which the t-shirt was worn. 10 6 The
court also did not discuss whether the student's t-shirt was indeed
contrary to and negatively impacted the school's educational mission,
seemingly deferring to the school's categorization of the shirt as
inappropriate.'
1 07
The Eleventh Circuit has also interpreted Fraser as supporting school
officials' decision to prohibit speech because the officials deem it
offensive, without considering all three Fraser factors. In Scott v. School
Board of Alachua County,'08 the Eleventh Circuit considered whether
school officials could forbid a student's display of the Confederate flag
on school grounds. 109 The court in Scott ultimately sided with the school
in holding that the ban did not violate the student's constitutional
worth ... self respect, and responsibility' and also the goal of instilling 'into the students, an
understanding and appreciation of the ideals of democracy and help them to be diligent and
competent in the performance of their obligations as citizens').
103. See id. at 470. By contrast, the Sixth Circuit has analyzed a similar set of factual
circumstances under Tinker. See Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536
(6th Cir. 2001). In Castorina, students were suspended for wearing t-shirts displaying the
Confederate flag. Id. at 538. Instead of applying Fraser, the court determined that Tinker provided
the most relevant test. Id. at 543. "Castorina and Boroffconcisely demonstrate the lower courts'
confused application of Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlemier." See Miller, supra, note 9 at 649.
104. See Borroff, 220 F.3d at 470.
105. See id.
106. The author acknowledges that a student wearing a questionable t-shirt will eventually walk
into the curricular context, such as a classroom and thus the t-shirt could be considered curricular
per se. However, the author submits that treating a t-shirt as curricular per se is overly broad
because a student could put the t-shirt on at lunch or in the parking lot, and then change before he
enters the classroom or a school assembly. For this reason, courts should not judge t-shirts under a
per se rule; they should evaluate t-shirts on a case-by-case basis.
107. See Boroff, 220 F.3d at 471 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[a] fair reading of the
record, however, suggests that the 'disruptive and demoralizing values' that the School was really
concerned about was disrespect for a specific venerated religious figure" and criticizing the majority
for "dropp[ing] its guard much too quickly at the School's conclusory invocation of 'disruptive and
demoralizing values"').
108. 324 F.3d 1246 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
109. See id. at 1247.
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rights.11 ° In so holding, the court focused on the offensive nature of the
flag and the likelihood that disruptive conduct would occur because of
the flag.111 The court did not mention the context in which the flag was
displayed.
In determining whether the content of the Confederate flag was
offensive, the court in Scott relied' l2 on Denno v. School Board of
Volusia County,' 13 a prior Eleventh Circuit decision. Like Scott, Denno
considered whether under Fraser the school could forbid a student's
display of the Confederate flag during school hours and on school
grounds. 114 The court in Denno acknowledged that the Confederate flag
is offensive to many people. 1 5 The court also explained that school
officials are charged with the duty of instructing students in civility and
socially appropriate behavior." 6 Because the display of an offensive
110. See id. at 1249.
111. See id. at 1248-49 (citing Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267 (11 th Cir.
2000)). The court in Scott upheld the ban under both Tinker and Fraser. See id. at 1249. In
upholding the ban under Tinker, the court necessarily found the display of the flag to be so
controversial as to likely cause an appreciable disruption in the school's discipline. See id. at 1248.
Therefore, it can be argued that the court in Scott impliedly considered the Fraser consequence
factor. However, outside of speculative reasoning, the court in Scott did not set forth any clear
evidence of disruption to the curricular context caused by the flag. See Scott, 324 F.3d at 1249
(discussing a fight that occurred at the school which appeared to be racially motivated, but failing to
mention if the fight occurred because of the flag or if the fight disrupted teaching or discipline in the
curricular context).
112. See id. at 1248 (citing Denno, 218 F.3d at 1267-70).
113. 218 F.3d 1267 (11 th Cir. 2000).
114. See id. at 1270-71. Unlike Scott, Denno concerned a determination of qualified immunity
for the school officials from whom Denno sought monetary compensation. See id. at 1269. Thus,
instead of simply deciding whether school officials violated the student's constitutional rights, the
court in Denno had to decide if the student's right to display the flag was clearly protected by the
constitution. See id. (citing Santamorena v. Georgia Military Coll., 147 F.3d 1337, 1339-40 (1 1th
Cir. 1998)). Because the Eleventh Circuit saw fit to rely heavily on Denno in Scott, it appears that
the Eleventh Circuit will use the Denno analysis even in "plainly offensive" cases where qualified
immunity is not an issue. Accordingly, this Comment will explore the decision in Denno because it
reflects the state of Eleventh Circuit "plainly offensive" jurisprudence.
115. See id. at 1274. During an outdoor lunch break at school, Denno displayed a 4" by 4"
Confederate battle flag to his friends as he discussed "historical issues of Southern heritage." See id.
at 1271. Without any disruption, the assistant principal approached Denno and ordered him to put
away his small flag. See id. When Denno tried to explain the historical importance of the flag, the
assistant principal suspended him from school. See id.
116. See id. at 1274-75 ("We do not believe that it would be unreasonable for a school official
to believe that such displays have uncivil aspects akin to those referred to in Fraser, in that many
people are offended when the Confederate flag is worn on a tee-shirt or otherwise displayed. We
cannot conclude that only a plainly incompetent school official would have viewed the instant
circumstances as implicating legitimate school functions relating to civility, and thus subject to ...
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symbol would conflict with this duty, the court held that Fraser
provided a proper basis to forbid the display of the Confederate flag." 7
Although on its face, parts of the opinion arguably could be read to
constitute a context and consequence inquiry, the court's indulgence of
these two Fraser factors was superficial at best. While the court
discussed the school's duty in instructing civility, the court did not
analyze whether the student's speech would indeed undermine or disrupt
such a duty." 8 The court also did not look at the context carefully.
Instead, the court was satisfied that the uncivil aspects of the
Confederate flag triggered "legitimate school functions relating to
civility, and thus subject to the school's authority under the more
flexible Fraser standard."'1 19
B. The Ninth Circuit Has Examined All Three Fraser Factors in
Determining Whether Speech Is Plainly Offensive, but It Has Not
Provided a Clear Analytical Framework
In contrast to the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit's selective application of
one or more of the Fraser factors when evaluating whether a regulation
permissively targets plainly offensive speech, the Ninth Circuit has
examined all three factors. In doing so, however, the Ninth Circuit did
not explicitly identify these factors. The Ninth Circuit also did not
provide a clear analytical framework for approaching plainly offensive
speech.
In Frederick v. Morse,120 the Ninth Circuit considered whether a
student's sign reading "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," displayed during a Winter
Olympics Torch Relay near, but not on campus, constituted plainly
offensive speech under Fraser.'21 The Court held that Tinker, not
Fraser.").
117. See id. at 1275. The Denno court ultimately ruled in the school's favor by affirming the
district court's grant of qualified immunity. Id. at 1278. The court declined to "decide the correct
legal standard" regarding student free speech. Id. at 1274 n.5. Instead, the court held that pre-
existing law did not dictate "the conclusion that the Tinker standard applies to the exclusion of the
Fraser standard." Id. (internal citation omitted).
118. See Denno, 218 F.3d at 1274-75.
119. Id.
120. 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006), cert granted, 127 S. Ct. 722 (Dec. 1, 2006) (argued March,
19,2007).
121. Id. at 1115. This case implicated the school's authority to silence student speech because it
was a quasi-school sponsored event. The school let students out of class early to watch the Olympic
Torch Relay go by the school (students stood on the sidewalk across from the school), the pep band
played, the cheerleaders greeted the torchbearers, and administrators such as the defendant assistant
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Fraser, controlled in this context because the speech was not "plainly
offensive."
122
In determining that the student speech was not plainly offensive, the
Ninth Circuit considered all three Fraser factors. However, it did not use
a clear analytical framework for identifying plainly offensive speech, let
alone direct lower courts to evaluate the three factors in order to properly
apply Fraser. First, the court addressed the content of the speech by
noting, "Frederick's speech was not sexual."'' 23 Second, the court
examined the context of the student's speech and noted that the speech
did not occur in a classroom. 124 Lastly, the court reviewed the
consequence of the speech and determined that the student speech did
not have the requisite disruptive effect.1 25 Accordingly, the court held,
"[t]he phrase 'Bong Hits 4 Jesus' may be funny, stupid, or insulting,
depending on one's point of view, but it is not 'plainly offensive' in the
way sexual innuendo is."
' 26
C. Although the Second Circuit Has Examined Two of the Three
Fraser Factors, It Did Not Use a Clear Analytical Framework and
It Is Thus Unclear Whether It Adopts All Three Factors
In the vague opinion of Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau,127 the
Second Circuit found that the student speech at issue did not meet the
Fraser test after analyzing only the content and consequence factors
without considering the context of the speech. The question in Guiles
was whether a student's political t-shirt could be regulated as plainly
offensive under Fraser.'28 The court acknowledged that Fraser granted
principal were present. See id. at 1115-16.
122. See id. at 1122; see also id. at 1123 ("We therefore hold that Frederick's punishment for
displaying his banner is best reviewed under Tinker . .
123. Id. at 1119.
124. Id. at 1123 ("Frederick's banner.., was displayed outside the classroom, across the street
from the school, during a non-curricular activity that was only partially supervised by school
officials.").
125. See id. ("It most certainly did not interfere with the school's basic educational mission.").
126. Id. at 1119.
127. 461 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006).
128. See id. at 322-23. Zachary Guiles, a 13-year-old middle school student, wore a t-shirt
critical of George W. Bush to school. Id. at 322. The front of the shirt had a large print that read
"George W. Bush" and "Chicken-Hawk-in-Chief." Id. Directly below these words was a picture of
the President's face, wearing a helmet, superimposed on the body of a chicken. Id. The front of the
t-shirt also featured images of dollar symbols, oil rigs, three lines of cocaine, and a razorblade. Id.
The back of the t-shirt had images of lines of cocaine, a martini glass, and phrases such as "Crook,"
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schools wide discretion to proscribe speech that is less than obscene.1 29
However, the court held that Fraser was not the appropriate standard
because the student's t-shirt was not plainly offensive.' 
30
The Second Circuit reached its conclusion by focusing on whether the
student's t-shirt was offensive in the same way as the speech in
Fraser.131 The court explained, "[c]ourts that address Fraser appear to
treat 'plainly offensive' synonymously with and as part and parcel of
speech that is lewd, vulgar, and indecent-meaning speech that is
something less than obscene but related to that concept, that is to say,
speech containing sexual innuendo and profanity."' 32 Because the court
found that the t-shirt lacked sexual innuendo or profanity, it was not
plainly offensive. 133 The court also considered the consequence of the t-
shirt, rejecting the school's claim that the speech had disrupted its
educational mission.'
34
The Second Circuit may have declined to examine the context of the
speech because, having found neither the content nor consequence
factors satisfied, it did not need to continue with the Fraser inquiry. By
determining that the student's t-shirt was not sexually explicit and
disruptive, the court technically did not need to answer the context
question to justify its refusal to apply Fraser. 35 Perhaps, given a
different set of facts, the court would have continued and applied all
three factors in its inquiry. However, as written, the court's opinion does
not indicate clearly whether it requires that all three Fraser factors be
"Cocaine Addict," and "Lying Drunk Driver." Id. After a parent objected to the t-shirt, the school
decided that the shirt violated the dress code and banned the t-shirt. See id. at 322-23.
129. Id. at 325.
130. See id. at 327 ("Fraser permits schools to censor student speech that is 'lewd,' 'vulgar,'
'indecent,' or 'plainly offensive.' . . . [T]hese depictions on their own are not lewd, vulgar, or
indecent. Lewdness, vulgarity, and indecency normally connote sexual innuendo or
profanity.... [T]he images depicted on Guiles's T-shirt are not plainly offensive as a matter of
law." (internal citations omitted)).
131. Seeid. at 327-29.
132. Id. at 328 ("In fact, the Supreme Court deemed Fraser's speech could be freely censored
because it was imbued with sexual references, bordering on the obscene.").
133. See id. at 329.
134. Id. at 330. The school claimed, "all images of illegal drugs and alcohol-even images
expressing an anti-drug view, such as those on Guiles's T-shirt-are plainly offensive because they
undermine the school's anti-drug message." Id. at 329. The court rejected the argument, noting that
"the phrase 'plainly offensive' as used in Fraser cannot be so broad as to be triggered whenever a
school decides a student's expression conflicts with its 'educational mission."' Id. at 330.
135. The court may also have assumed that a t-shirt worn by a student is in a curricular context
per se, however this assumption is overly broad and inappropriate. See supra note 106.
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present to permit regulation of student speech as plainly offensive.
In sum, lower courts do not consistently interpret and apply Fraser.
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have focused mainly on the content of
the student speech in determining whether it is plainly offensive. The
Ninth Circuit examined all three Fraser factors, and the Second Circuit
examined two out of three, but neither circuit provided a clear analytical
framework or explained their methodologies in determining plainly
offensive speech.
IV. THE CIRCUIT COURTS HAVE FAILED TO CLEARLY-AND
SOMETIMES ACCURATELY-APPLY FRASER
The Supreme Court, through the Tinker trilogy, established three tests
to evaluate the regulation of student speech.136 When a court encounters
a student speech issue, it should first determine whether the speech is
school-sponsored under Hazelwood.137 If the restricted speech is not
school-sponsored but is sexually explicit or otherwise offensive, the
court should perform a Fraser analysis. 138 Finally, if the restricted
speech is not plainly offensive under Fraser, the court should apply
Tinker to determine whether the speech nevertheless threatened
substantial disruption of schoolwork or invaded the rights of other
students. 139 Absent applicability of any of the trilogy cases, students
retain their First Amendment free speech rights in the school context.1
40
In order to avoid inadvertently chilling the exercise of these retained
rights, 14 1 it is essential that lower courts adhere to the Fraser framework
and include a discussion of the content, context, and consequence of the
proscribed speech when addressing questions of plainly offensive
student speech.
136. See supra Part 1.
137. See supra Part II.C.
138. See supra Part ll.B.
139. See supra Part II.A.
140. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1968) ("It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the school house gate.").
141. See Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 14, at 183 ("The majority of courts have cited Fraser
in such a way as to give public school officials free reign to censor vulgar, lewd, or plainly
offensive student speech. Some courts have gone a step further and prohibited student speech that
contains offensive ideas."); see also id. at 204 (explaining that an overly broad reading of Fraser
will "lead to a chilling effect on speech"); Miller, supra note 9, at 646 (noting that "[w]ithout
guidance, the rules espoused by Tinker, Fraser, and [Hazelwood] have become nebulous and
unpredictable").
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A. The "Plainly Offensive" Framework Requires Evaluation of the
Content, Context, and Consequence of Student Speech
Once a court decides that analysis under Fraser is appropriate, in
order to avoid broadening the plainly offensive exception beyond that
approved of in Fraser, the court should then use a three-part analytical
framework derived from the Fraser opinion. Under this framework,
courts should focus on the content, 142 context, 143 and consequence 144 of
the student speech. A court may determine that speech is plainly
offensive only when all three factors are satisfied. The proposed
framework organizes the factors implicitly relied upon by the Court in
Fraser.45 This framework strikes the appropriate balance between
protecting students' free speech and the allowing school officials to
fulfill their educational mission. Exceptions to free expression
protections are to be narrowly construed,146 and this framework prevents
the narrow exception of Fraser from swallowing Tinker's more general
rule. 147 This Part illustrates that court decisions made in the absence of
such a framework have failed to provide guidance to lower courts and
are overly broad and thus excessively restrict student speech.'
48
142. See supra Part II.B.I.
143. See supra Part I1.B.2.
144. See supra Part I.B.3.
145. See supra Part II.B.
146. See supra Part I (explaining narrow interpretations of limitations on free speech); see also
supra Part 1l.D (demonstrating why Fraser is an exception to Tinker).
147. See supra text accompanying note 28.
148. While the Ninth Circuit properly considered all three Fraser factors, the right decision,
without a clear framework, does not lessen the confusion that already exists in applying Fraser. See
Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 2006) (despite using Frederick for
guidance, the court still lamented the "unsettled waters of free speech rights in public schools,
waters rife with rocky shoals and uncertain currents"). In order to reduce confusion and
disagreement about what constitutes plainly offensive speech, the circuits that analyze all relevant
factors from Fraser should provide a proper framework. See Miller, supra note 9, at 646, 649. A
proper framework is necessary to clearly identify those factors of Fraser that courts must analyze.
See id. at 646. Such an approach allows resolution of the confusion surrounding Fraser, improves
judicial efficiency, and most importantly, enables school officials to do their jobs without violating
the free speech rights of students. See id. (arguing that judges and school officials will be able to do
their jobs more efficiently with a proper framework in place because a framework is likely to
prevent "the rules espoused by Tinker, Fraser, and [Hazelwood]" from being "nebulous and
unpredictable").
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B. Lower Courts Have Neither Consistently Nor Clearly Applied All
Three of the Fraser Factors
By failing to explicitly enumerate the three factors it focused on in
Fraser, or to explicitly require lower courts to analyze those precise
factors, the Court created a vague "plainly offensive" standard that
continues to cause confusion among lower courts today. 149 Absent
clearer guidance from the Supreme Court about the proper application of
Fraser, some circuit courts pick and choose among the Fraser factors. 50
The Ninth Circuit appeared to examine all the Fraser factors, and the
Second Circuit examined two out of three factors, but both circuits failed
to provide a framework that lower courts can follow. 15' Most
importantly, the absence of a clear framework for determining plainly
offensive speech has led both to overregulation by school officials and
the deterioration of student free speech rights recognized in Tinker. 1
52
1. The Proposed Framework Demonstrates that the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuit Courts Have Applied an Overly Broad
Interpretation of Fraser
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits strayed from Fraser's holding in two
respects. First, the courts incorrectly applied some of the Fraser factors.
Both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits erred in applying the content factor,
by employing an overly broad definition of "offensive" content. 15' The
Eleventh Circuit also erred in applying the consequence factor by failing
to require more evidence than mere speculation that the speech would
cause a disruptive consequence on the curricular context.154 Second, both
149. See supra Part III.
150. Several cases illustrate what happens when courts fail to focus on all the relevant factors
from Fraser. See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, 324 F.3d 1246 (1 1th Cir. 2003)
(focusing only on content and arguably consequence) (citing Denno ex rel. Denno v. Sch. Bd. of
Volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267 (11 th Cir. 2000) (content)); Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ.,
220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000) (content); see also Part III.A.
151. See Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 722 (Dec.
1, 2006) (argued March, 19, 2007) (content, context, consequence); Guiles, 461 F.3d at 321-31
(content, consequence); infra Part IV.B.2.
152. See Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 14, at 183; see also id. at 203-04 ("Another danger
with the broad reading of Fraser is that it places educators in the unenviable position of determining
what is vulgar or profane ... teachers are ... likely to err on the side of censorship, thus restricting
more speech than is necessary.").
153. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); supra Part II.B.1.
154. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; supra Part II.B.3.
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circuits failed to analyze all three Fraser factors. 155
Student speech triggers plainly offensive analysis when it contains
lewd, indecent, or vulgar content.156 In Boroff, the Sixth Circuit held that
a student's t-shirt was offensive because it promoted demoralizing
values and mocked a religious figure. 57 The court's analysis, however,
departs from Fraser, which focused on offensive content, not
controversial messages. 1
58
The Eleventh Circuit similarly engaged in an overly-broad
interpretation of Fraser's content factor. In Denno, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the Confederate flag was offensive to many people.' 59
Subsequently, in Scott, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the analysis in
Denno that found the Confederate flag to be offensive. 60 The Eleventh
Circuit erred in its analysis because to censor the Confederate flag on the
basis of Fraser's content prong, the flag itself has to be sexually explicit
or lewd. 161 However, the flag itself, while offensive to many because of
the controversial message of racism, is not sexually explicit or lewd.'
62
Because the flag itself is not sexually explicit or lewd, it cannot be
considered plainly offensive under Fraser's content prong. The Eleventh
Circuit should have concluded that lacking sexually explicit content,
Fraser should not have entered the court's analysis, and that Tinker was
the controlling case.
To be regulated as plainly offensive, speech must also have a
disruptive consequence on a school's curricular activity or educational
mission. 63 In Scott, the Eleventh Circuit merely noted that because
155. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; supra Parts II.B. 1-3.
156. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (1986); supra Part lB. 1.
157. See Boroff, 220 F.3d at 470; supra Part III.A.
158. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; supra Parts II.B. 1 and M.A.
159. Denno ex rel. Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267, 1274 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
As discussed supra note 114, Denno dealt with qualified immunity, the abrogation of which
required the court to find not only that the student had a right to the speech in question, but also that
such a right was clearly established.
160. See Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, 324 F.3d 1246, 1248 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (citing
Denno, 218 F.3d at 1267-70).
161. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; supra Part I..1.
162. See Denno, 218 F.3d at 1274 n.6 ("Similarly, it is not dispositive that common experience
teaches us that the Confederate flag is honored by many people as a non-racist memorial to their
Southern heritage; common experience also teaches that many people perceive the flag as offensive,
constituting either a racist message or at least reflecting an uncivil lack of sensitivity to the
sensibilities of many people.").
163. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 ("[T]he schools, as instruments of the state, may determine
that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd,
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racial incidents had occurred in the past at the school, the display of the
Confederate flag would have a disruptive consequence on the school's
ability to instruct students in civility.' 64 However, in Fraser, the Court
examined evidence indicating the speech actually disrupted the
curricular context.165 In dicta, the Court also indicated that schools could
prospectively regulate speech likely to disrupt the curricular activities.
66
However, Fraser should be narrowly interpreted as an exception to
student free speech, 167 so courts should require more significant
evidence beyond mere speculation that an activity is likely to disrupt the
school's curricular activity.168 In Scott, the Eleventh Circuit merely
noted that because racial incidents had occurred in the past at the school,
the display of the Confederate flag would have a disruptive consequence
on the school's ability to instruct students in civility. 69 The Eleventh
Circuit should have required evidence beyond mere speculation that the
Confederate flag would disrupt the school's activity or educational
mission.
To avoid extending Fraser's restrictions on speech to situations not
encompassed by that decision, a court must analyze all three Fraser
factors: content, context, and consequence. 170 In Boroff, the Sixth Circuit
only examined the content factor by explaining that the t-shirt contained
vulgar and offensive messages.' 71 The court examined neither the
context in which the t-shirt was worn, nor whether the t-shirt was
contrary to and negatively impacted the school's educational mission.172
The court in Boroff might have arrived at a different conclusion if it had
indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy."); see also
id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court's holding concerns only the authority that school
officials have to restrict a high school student's use of disruptive language in a speech given to a
high school assembly.").
164. See Scott, 324 F.3d at 1248-49.
165. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678.
166. See supra Part II.B.3.
167. See supra Parts I & IV.A.
168. For example, the school should present and the court should examine evidence in the form
of news stories or studies indicating that such speech has been disruptive to curricular activities in
other schools.
169. See supra Part I.A.
170. See supra Parts II.B & W.A.
171. See Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 467 (6th Cir. 2000); supra Part
III.
172. See supra Part Il.A.
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properly applied Fraser by examining all three factors. 173
The Denno and Scott cases demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit also
failed to apply all three Fraser factors.174 The court in Denno cited
Fraser and its command for courts to balance a student's right to free
expression and the countervailing interest of schools to teach students
the boundaries of civility. 75 The court reasoned that because the
Confederate flag was offensive and uncivil, it triggered Fraser and its
"more flexible" standard for restricting student speech. 176
Even assuming the Eleventh Circuit properly applied Fraser's content
factor in Denno, the court did not inquire into the context and
consequence factors. While the court in Denno noted the school's duty
to teach students civility, it did not analyze whether the display of the
Confederate flag disrupted the school's ability to instruct the students
about civility. 77 The court also failed to analyze the context in which the
Confederate flag displayed on campus. 178 Later, the Eleventh Circuit
made a similar omission of one Fraser's factors in Scott. Again citing to
Denno, the Eleventh Circuit in Scott held that because the flag was
offensive and might disrupt the school's ability to teach civility,
Fraser's more flexible standard for evaluating free speech applied. 7 9 In
Scott, the court failed to examine the context in which the flag was
displayed. Had the Eleventh Circuit appropriately applied all three
Fraser factors, it may have arrived at a different conclusion.
80
173. For example, if the court had examined the context factor, it might have found that the
student was willing to cover up the t-shirt while in class, but just wanted to wear the t-shirt on
school grounds during school breaks and lunch periods. If the court had examined the consequence
factor, the court might have found that even if the student wore the shirt during class, the t-shirt did
not disrupt curricular activities.
174. See supra Part III.A.
175. Denno exreL Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267, 1275 (llth Cir. 2000);
see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
176. See Denno, 218 F.3d at 1274-75.
177. See id; supra Part III.A.
178. See supra Part III.A.
179. See Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, 324 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11 th Cir. 2003) (citing
Denno, 218 F.3d at 1273).
180. For example, had the court in Scott examined the context factor, it may have found that the
ban even prohibited students from displaying the Confederate flag in the school parking lot; a
situation far removed from the curricular context.
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2. The Proposed Framework Demonstrates that the Ninth and Second
Circuits Could Have More Clearly Applied Fraser
The Ninth Circuit, in determining whether student speech is plainly
offensive, appears to apply all three of the Fraser factors but
nevertheless fails to provide a clear analytical framework to guide other
courts in doing the same. In Frederick, the court held that a student's
"Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banner was not plainly offensive.' 8 1 In reaching its
decision, the court declined to follow the Sixth Circuit's broad reading
of Fraser.'82 The court explained that the Boroff court interpreted Fraser
to grant school officials too much discretion to regulate certain messages
at school. 83 Specifically, the court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's
loose interpretation of "plainly offensive speech."' 84 Instead, the Ninth
Circuit held that Fraser permits schools to prohibit only vulgar, obscene,
lewd, or sexual speech that would promote "disruption and diversion
from the educational curriculum."'8 5 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
evaluated the content of the student's speech, its context, 186 and its
consequence. 87  But while the Ninth Circuit relied on factors from
Fraser, it did not explicitly organize those factors into a clear analytical
framework for other courts to follow.
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Guiles declined to follow Boroff s
broad reading of Fraser.'88 However, the Guiles opinion only explicitly
analyzed the factors of content and consequence from Fraser; regarding
181. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 722 (Dec. 1,
2006) (argued March, 19, 2007).
182. See id. at 1122.
183. Id.
184. See id. ("[T]o the degree Boroffimplies that student speech may be prohibited as 'plainly
offensive' whenever it conflicts with a vaguely-defined 'educational mission,' we decline to follow
it."); see also id. at 1122 n.44 ("The word 'offensive' is not a catch-all to embrace any speech that
might offend some hearers. Nor was Fraser an invitation to censor and punish any speech that
offends school authorities.").
185. Id. at 1122 n.44.
186. See id. at 1123 ("Boroff sought to wear his T-shirt in the classroom, where its message
would be more likely to interfere with the school's core educational mission. Frederick's banner, by
comparison, was displayed outside the classroom, across the street from the school, during a non-
curricular activity that was only partially supervised by school officials.").
187. See id. ("It most certainly did not interfere with the school's basic educational mission.").
188. See Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 329 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining "to
adopt the position of the Sixth Circuit in Boroff that a school has broad authority under Fraser to
prohibit speech that is 'inconsistent with its basic educational mission' (quoting Boroff v. Van
Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 2000))).
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context, the opinion is silent. Specifically, the Guiles court first
determined that the student's t-shirt could not be plainly offensive
because it did not contain profanity or sexual innuendo.'1 89 The court also
did not accept the school's claim that the student's t-shirt disrupted its
educational mission. 190 By analyzing content and consequence, the court
determined that Fraser did not apply and never reached the question of
context. 191 In so doing, the court reached the correct result but did not
provide a clear framework.
The failure of the Ninth and Second Circuits to provide a clear
analytical framework is problematic because it contributes to an
inconsistent application of Fraser.'92 By failing to adhere to all three
factors identified in Fraser, courts effectively lower the threshold that
school officials must meet to invoke Fraser.1 93 In turn, Fraser may
encourage school officials to overregulate student speech.194 Both
circuits could have achieved greater clarity by explicitly organizing their
analysis according to the content, context, and consequence prongs of
the proposed framework. In so doing, the courts could have lessened
existing confusion regarding Fraser's application and helped ensure that
schools do not rely on Fraser to overregulate student speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Fraser, the Supreme Court determined that students in public
schools do not possess a First Amendment right to engage in "plainly
offensive" speech. In establishing that plainly offensive speech may be
regulated, the Court did not clearly identify the factors or characteristics
that must be present for a student's speech to be proscribed.
Nevertheless, in coming to its conclusion that the speech at issue in
Fraser met the criteria, the Court focused on certain elements of the
speech that can be categorized into three factors: content, context, and
189. See id. at 327-28.
190. See id. at 329.
191. See supra Part II.A.
192. See Miller, supra note 9, at 646.
193. See, e.g., Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 14, at 183 (noting that a "majority of courts have
cited Fraser in such a way as to give public school officials free reign to censor vulgar, lewd, or
plainly offensive student speech" (emphasis added)).
194. See id. at 203-04 (regarding the danger of reading Fraser broadly, the court stated that
"teachers are far more likely to err on the side of censorship, thus restricting more speech than is
necessary").
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consequence. Absent a clear mandate from the Court that these three
factors must be analyzed when addressing whether certain speech is
plainly offensive, lower courts have struggled to apply Fraser. Applying
the three Fraser factors consistently would both eliminate the confusion
surrounding the parameters of what constitutes plainly offensive speech
and prevent the unapproved expansion of schools' power to regulate
speech. The current confused practice risks unconstitutional regulation
of student speech to which Tinker, Fraser, or Hazelwood do not apply
and which the First Amendment thus protects.
